The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 88 (2019)

Article 11

B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Assn. v.
British Columbia (Attorney General): Mandatory
Registration Rules, and Limits on Third Party
Political Expression under the Charter
Michael Pal
Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Pal, Michael. "B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Assn. v. British Columbia (Attorney General): Mandatory Registration Rules,
and Limits on Third Party Political Expression under the Charter." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference 88. (2019).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol88/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

B.C. Freedom of Information and
Privacy Assn. v. British Columbia
(Attorney General): Mandatory
Registration Rules, and Limits on
Third Party Political Expression
under the Charter
Michael Pal

I. INTRODUCTION
The laws regulating political participation by third parties have long
been constitutionally controversial in Canada. Third parties are generally
understood to include all individuals, groups and organizations, other than
political parties and their affiliated entities such as riding associations.
Rules relating to political expression1 and, especially, third party
participation in provincial and federal elections have frequently been
before the courts.2 The central constitutional dilemma posed in these cases


Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, and Director of the Public Law
Group. I disclose that I was an external legal advisor to the Attorney General of Ontario for the
Province’s 2017 campaign finance reforms. I can be reached at: mpal@uottawa.ca.
1
Haig v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.); Osborne v. Canada
(Treasury Board), [1991] S.C.J. No. 45, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69 (S.C.C.); Thomson Newspapers Co.
(c.o.b. Globe and Mail) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”]; Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v.
Canadian Federation of Students – British Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2
S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.); Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bryan”].
2
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 48, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”]; Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997]
3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Libman”]; Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] A.J.
No. 515, 184 A.R. 241 (Alta. C.A.); National Citizens Coalition v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1984] A.J. No. 2615, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (Alta. Q.B.). See Leonid Sirota, “‘Third Parties’ and
Democracy 2.0” (2015) 60:2 McGill L.J. 253; Colin Feasby, “Constitutional Questions About
Canada’s New Political Finance Regime” (2007) 45:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513; Keith Ewing, Money,
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is relatively straightforward. Any non-trivial restriction on third party
political expression violates section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms3 and harms a form of expression, namely political
speech, which the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly said is at the
“core” of the guarantee of free expression.4 Despite the constitutional costs
imposed on third parties, however, regulating their political expression is
necessary in order to ensure broader goals such as the integrity of the
election and the creation of a level playing field so that politics is not
simply dominated by moneyed interests.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s 2017 decision in B.C. Freedom of
Information and Privacy Assn. v. British Columbia (Attorney General),5
is the most recent case to grapple with these countervailing considerations.
The leading case remains Harper v. Canada6 from 2004, which saw the
Court split 6-3 on what limits could be imposed on third party political
expression. The Court in Harper upheld the federal rules requiring third
parties to (1) register and disclose basic information about themselves in
order to engage in political advertising during the election period;
(2) adhere to spending limits; and (3) not circumvent the laws limiting
their activities. The least contentious of the three holdings in Harper was
the registration requirement imposed on third parties. Even the dissenting
opinion in Harper accepted its constitutionality.7
The constitutional challenge in BC FIPA sought to test the boundaries
of this holding from Harper. The British Columbia Freedom of
Information and Privacy Association challenged the registration
requirement in section 239 in the province’s Election Act,8 as it applied to
those spending less than $500 on election advertising, for violating section
2(b) and not being saved by section 1 of the Charter. Their main argument
was that individuals or small organizations spending minute amounts of
money on a T-shirt, bumper sticker, or homemade sign communicating a
political message would be required to register. The organization
Politics, and Law: A Study of Electoral Campaign Finance Reform in Canada (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992); Andrew Geddis, “Liberté, Égalité, Argent: Third Party Election Spending and the
Charter” (2004) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 429; Jay Makarenko, “Fair Opportunity to Participate: The Charter
and the Regulation of Electoral Speech” (2009) 3:2 Canadian Political Science Review 38.
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
Bryan, supra, note 1, at para. 26, per Bastarache J., and at paras. 99, 107, 110 and 125,
per Abella J. (dissenting).
5
[2017] S.C.J. No. 6, 2017 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “BC FIPA”].
6
Harper, supra, note 2.
7
Id., at para. 1, per MacLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.
8
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 106 [hereinafter “BC Election Act”].
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contended that such a requirement chilled expression, harmed those who
wished or had a reason to remain anonymous, and imposed a significant
administrative burden on those seeking to exercise a fundamental freedom.
Then-Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the unanimous Court in BC
FIPA, rejected these arguments and upheld the regime as being a legitimate
restriction on political expression that furthered the values of openness,
transparency, and accountability.9
This paper will analyze the implications of BC FIPA for campaign
finance law and the scope of permissible limits on the freedom of
political expression of third parties under the Charter. BC FIPA was the
first case involving third parties and their freedom of expression under
section 2(b) to reach the Court since Harper. It is the only one of four
different constitutional challenges to the provincial Elections Act in
British Columbia in recent years to go beyond the province’s courts and
reach the Supreme Court of Canada. At stake in the case was whether
Harper should be read narrowly, as the British Columbia courts had done
in the earlier cases, or whether it should instead be interpreted broadly in
a manner permitting more extensive regulation of third parties. The
consequences of how to interpret Harper are significant, given recent
changes to federal and provincial campaign finance laws whose
constitutionality are untested.
I will argue that BC FIPA hints that the Court may be open to
interpreting Harper in a broad enough fashion to sustain many of the
reforms that are needed to ensure a functioning campaign finance system
in light of widespread changes to how third parties now operate. While
seeking a relatively narrow remedy applying technically only to a
provincial statute, the claimant could only have succeeded in BC FIPA
had the Court accepted that registration requirements impose serious
constitutional harm to third parties. Such a finding would have
potentially imperilled attempts to regulate quickly evolving third party
political activity. The Court’s rejection of the claim in BC FIPA has
positive implications, for example, for the constitutionality of pre-writ
registration requirements that would be imposed federally by Bill C-76,
the Elections Modernization Act,10 and which have been in place in
Ontario for provincial elections since 2017.11
9

BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 51.
At the time of writing, Bill C-76 had passed the House of Commons and was before a
Senate Committee. It looks likely to be passed in time for the 2019 federal election.
11
Election Finances Statute Law Amendment Act, 2016, S.O. 2016, c. 22.
10
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Before proceeding to elaborate upon that argument, it is worth flagging
the relevance of BC FIPA to constitutional scholars and practitioners
generally. First, the Court in BC FIPA was unanimous despite often
dividing on section 2(b) cases,12 which may indicate possible alignment in
the views of the current justices on expression. Close consideration of the
broader implications for section 2(b) outside of the realm of political
expression is beyond the scope of this paper, but the issue merits further
investigation.
Second, BC FIPA is also an important moment in the debate
surrounding the use of social science evidence in the justification
analysis for the limitation of rights and freedoms. The Court permitted
the Province’s section 1 argument to succeed despite the fact that British
Columbia failed to produce any social science evidence to justify the
infringement. “[S]ocial science evidence may not be necessary” in some
cases, McLachlin C.J.C. ruled, “[w]here the scope of the infringement is
minimal”.13 At least in cases involving political expression, the
sufficiency of the social science evidence on offer has often been a key
issue in the section 1 analysis.14 The Court in BC FIPA stated as bluntly
as it ever has that rights infringements may be upheld even in the total
absence of social science evidence. The Court held that where
infringements of a right or freedom, while meeting the standard to
proceed to the section 1 analysis as breaches of the Charter, impose
relatively minimal harm to the claimant, then social science evidence
need not be led by the state as part of its burden of proof under section 1.15
This approach may portend some movement in the Court’s approach to
section 1 generally, or at least as applied to cases engaging freedom of
expression or specifically political expression.
Third, and quite controversially, the Court engaged in an exercise of
statutory interpretation that significantly changed the contours of the
case as argued below.16 The Court’s interpretation of the Statute was
alien to that on offer from any of the parties or the justices in the lower
courts. Alison Latimer’s contribution to this volume argues that the
12

See, for example, Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 1 and Harper, supra, note 2.
BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 58.
Michael Pal, “Democratic Rights and Social Science Evidence” (2014) 32:2 N.J.C.L. 151;
Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and Deference: The Role of Social Science Evidence in Election
cases” (2014) 32:2 N.J.C.L. 173.
15
BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 58.
16
See the paper by Alison M. Latimer in this volume for a critique of the Court’s
interpretive approach: “Constitutional Conversations” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 231.
13
14
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Court acted wrongly in adopting a novel approach to the case.17 As will
become clear in the course of this paper, I disagree with that argument,
but the leeway envisioned by the Court for itself in BC FIPA to redefine
the core issues in a case will certainly be of relevance to constitutional
litigators as they craft their cases and seek to anticipate their reception
before the Court.
The main significance of the case, however, is for what it portends
for Canadian campaign finance law, which is the central subject of
this paper. This paper proceeds as follows: Part II details the
particulars of the BC FIPA case, especially the statutory regime at
issue, the Court’s section 2(b) approach, and its section 1 analysis.
Part III fills in gaps in the Court’s reasoning by analyzing the
importance and, even, necessity of registration rules for functioning
campaign finance systems. Part IV places the case in the context of
Canadian campaign finance jurisprudence, including Harper.
It considers the implications of BC FIPA for the inevitable
constitutional challenge to the registration requirements in Bill C-76.
I conclude in Part V by offering some thoughts on the significant
legacy of now-retired Chief Justice McLachlin with regard to political
expression, which was capped off by her authorship of the unanimous
decision in BC FIPA.

II. BC FIPA — THE CASE
1. The British Columbia Election Act
The drafters of British Columbia’s Election Act18 have had a rough go
as of late. The statute that regulates most aspects of provincial elections19
has been the subject of three successful constitutional challenges in
recent years in the British Columbia courts. Its third party spending
limits in the pre-writ period have been struck down twice for violating

17

Id.
Supra, note 8.
19
Related statutes that regulate other aspects of elections and politics include: Income Tax
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 215 (political contributions); Financial Disclosure Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 139
(disclosure rules for elected representatives); and Electoral Reform Referendum 2018 Act, S.B.C.
2017, c. 22 (2018 referendum on electoral reform).
18
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section 2(b) of the Charter,20 and an earlier case disapproved of the
restrictions in the Act on public opinion polling.21
These victories for civil society and media groups appear to have
emboldened the claimant in BC FIPA to argue that the registration
provision for third parties in the Election Act should be found
unconstitutional on classic civil libertarian grounds. The claimant
organization argued that the requirement to register in order to engage in
political advertising during the election period was an undue burden that
could not be justified.22 Their preferred remedy was to read in a $500
spending threshold for when the registration requirement begins to apply.
That amount is the current threshold in the federal Canada Elections Act
for when registration is required for domestic third parties.23 The $500
threshold was found to be constitutional in Harper. The claimant in BC
FIPA sought to transform a finding from the Court in Harper that the
federal threshold was constitutionally compliant into a requirement for
Charter conformity.
The BC Election Act sets out the details of third party registration in
sections 239 to 240. The process for registration detailed in these provisions
is routine and commonplace across Canadian jurisdictions. Section 239
requires anyone who is an “election advertising sponsor” to register.
Section 240 details the registration process that must be undertaken with
the non-partisan electoral body, Elections British Columbia, and its Chief
Electoral Officer (“CEO”). The application must include basic
information, including the election sponsor’s name and address if an
individual, the names of its principal officers or members if it is an
organization, and a phone number. The application must also be signed. If
the paperwork is complete, the CEO “must” register the election
advertising sponsor “as soon as practicable” according to section 240(5).
There is little discretion in the hands of the CEO, except to require that the
application be in a “specified form” pursuant to section 240(4). The
legislation imposes an attribution requirement as well, where information
about the sponsor of the advertising must be disclosed (section 231(1)).
A regulation issued by the CEO exempted certain kinds of expression from
20
Reference re Election Act (B.C.), [2012] B.C.J. No. 2037, 2012 BCCA 394 (B.C.C.A.);
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2009] B.C.J. No. 619,
2009 BCSC 436 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2011] B.C.J. No. 1945, 2011 BCCA 408 (B.C.C.A.).
21
Pacific Press, a Division of Southam Inc. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000]
B.C.J. No. 308, 2000 BCSC 248 (B.C.S.C.).
22
BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 12.
23
S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 353(1) [hereinafter “Canada Elections Act”].
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the attribution requirement, such as on “clothing”, “novelty items” and
“small items of nominal value that are intended for personal use.”24
It is important to note that the application and scope of the registration
requirement is constrained in three pertinent ways. The obligation to
register only applies to advertising that (1) occurs during the campaign
period; (2) that counts as political advertising; and (3) which is “sponsored”.
All three of these provisions decrease any imposition of harm on freedom of
political expression.
First, the registration obligation is time-limited as it only applies to
advertising during the statutorily defined official election or “campaign
period”.25 Elections in British Columbia occur on a fixed date, every four
years, except when early elections are triggered such as by a loss of
confidence in the government and dissolution by the Lieutenant-Governor.26
The election campaign period is set at 28 days, with some minor
exceptions.27 Registration is therefore generally only required for advertising
carried out during 28 out of every 1,460 days. Amendments to the legislation
after the case was launched would also require registration in the 60-day
period before the official campaign period, bringing the total to 88 days.
Second, the registration requirement applies only to a specific kind of
communication, namely “election advertising”.28 Election or political
advertising can be distinguished from “issue” advertisements.29 Election
advertising typically advocates for the election or defeat of a particular
candidate, political party or its leader. The British Columbia statute
defines “campaign period election advertising” to be “transmission to
the public by any means, during the campaign period, of an advertising
message that promotes or opposes, directly or indirectly, a registered
political party or the election of a candidate”.30 By contrast, issue
advertisements express an opinion on an issue, which may be
political, without tying it to an electoral outcome such as a particular
candidate or party winning or losing. Citizens, associations,
corporations, unions or any other entity are therefore permitted to run
unlimited issue advertisements. There are no limits in British Columbia
24

Election Advertising Regulation, B.C. Reg. 329/2008, s. 2.
Section 228 (now repealed, S.B.C. 2017, c. 20, s. 29) defined “election advertising” as
occurring only during “the campaign period”: BC Election Act, supra, note 8.
26
Constitution Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 66, s. 23.
27
BC Election Act, supra, note 8, s. 27.
28
Id., s. 229.
29
Colin Feasby, “Issue Advocacy and Third Parties in the United Kingdom and Canada”
(2003) 48 McGill L.J. 11 [hereinafter “Feasby”].
30
BC Election Act, supra, note 8, s. 1 and s. 229 (emphasis added).
25
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on running issue advertisements that express the need to “Save the
Whales”. Only if the expression indicates that you can “Save the
Whales by Defeating Political Party X” is it caught by section 229 of
the British Columbia statute.
The definition in section 1 of the BC Election Act for “campaign period
election advertising” includes within it “an advertising message that takes
a position on an issue with which a registered political party or candidate is
associated”.31 This clause in the definition is not a restriction on true issue
advertising, but an anti-avoidance mechanism to catch “sham issue
advocacy”.32 Sham issue advertisements are communications disguised as
issue advertisements that are in actuality election advertising. The Canada
Elections Act 33 contains similar language to prevent sham issue
advertising. Ontario’s legislation uses “closely associated” rather than
“associated” as the standard.34 Sham issue advertising is a classic form of
electoral malfeasance. It typically occurs when a third party running
election advertising against a candidate reaches its spending limit. Sham
issue advertisers would then continue the advertisement in the same form
except without a direct reference to a candidate. Without the clause
capturing issues “associated” with a candidate, the simple change of
eliminating a direct reference to a candidate would allow easy evasion of
spending limits and registration rules that apply to political advertisements,
even if the reasonable viewer would understand the message to be
targeting a particular individual. This scenario is especially relevant if
there is a political issue that is so closely associated with a politician that
advertising on the issue is inextricable from the party or candidate.
Third, registration is also obligatory only for “sponsors of election
advertising”.35 It was the meaning of the term “sponsor” around which
the Supreme Court’s statutory analysis of the British Columbia
legislation turned. Sponsorship is defined in section 229 as including
those who pay for election advertising or receive it free of charge, or
anyone acting on their behalves. The British Columbia legislation
requires registration of any advertising sponsor. There is no monetary
threshold for a minimum amount of spending before the obligation
applies. The sponsorship provision in the British Columbia legislation
31

Id. The definition in s. 1 includes exceptions for the media, internal communications to
shareholders or union members, or personal political views transmitted on the Internet, among other items.
32
Feasby, supra, note 29, at 13.
33
Supra, note 23, s. 319.
34
Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-7, s. 1(1), definition of “political advertising”.
35
BC Election Act, supra, note 8, s. 229.
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raised the question of whether everyone who engaged in election
advertising during the campaign period counted as a “sponsor” or
whether spending of trivial or small amounts were exempt.
Mandatory registration and disclosure of personal or organizational
information, even if not unduly intrusive, is compelled speech and
therefore always has a constitutional dimension. In the lower courts, the
British Columbia Freedom of Information and Privacy Association
(FIPA) organization acknowledged that the Harper Court found
compelled speech in the form of registration for third parties spending
more than $500 to be constitutional. The FIPA organization sought a
holding that the registration provision in British Columbia was
unconstitutional as it applied to those spending less than $500. On its
claim, small spenders, self-expressers, meaning those who put up
handmade signs or wore clothing with political messages, or “lone
pamphleteer[s]”36 and the like should be able to engage in political
advertising during the campaign period without having to register
themselves with the electoral authority. Registration on this view harmed
the legitimate desire of these individuals to remain anonymous, would
chill political expression, and would impose an obligation to get state
approval to exercise a fundamental freedom, or else face repercussions
for violating the Election Act.
The Court at first instance and the British Columbia Court of Appeal
both disagreed. They held that the section 2(b) freedom of the FIPA
organization was impaired in a manner that violated section 2(b), but that
these limits were justified under section 1. The Court of Appeal was
divided 2-1. Justice Saunders dissented at the Court of Appeal, holding that
registration was not justified given its impact on “‘small and independent
voices’” and those who for reasons of ‘“personal security’” would prefer
not to register so as to remain anonymous.37 Of particular relevance in
the claimant’s argument and in the dissent of Saunders J.A. was the fact
that Elections B.C. had in a 2010 report interpreted its home statute to
oblige small spenders to register, which the organization identified as a
problem requiring a legislative fix.38

36

BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 38.
Id., at paras. 20 and 14.
38
Id., at para. 19; B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Assn. v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [2015] B.C.J. No. 774, 2015 BCCA 172, at para. 22 (B.C.C.A.).
37
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2. The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
BC FIPA is arguably an exception to the general rule that judicial
decisions on expression cases largely turn on section 1. The Court
technically resolved the case by finding that the registration requirement
was an infringement of section 2(b) that was not saved by section 1.
The few paragraphs dealing with section 1 in the judgment, however, are
perfunctory. It is hard to conclude other than that the real analytical work
happened at the section 2(b) stage. For section 2(b), it is relatively easy for
most claimants with plausible arguments that their freedom has been
infringed to meet the inclusive standard for expression set out by the
jurisprudence of “conveys or attempts to convey a meaning”.39 Nearly all
kinds of communication are caught, even potentially physical actions,
though with the notable exceptions of violence or threats of violence.40 The
requirement that the state be restricting expression in purpose or effect is
also usually easily met. To be protected, expression must also be tied to one
or more of the three purposes underlying the guarantee: (1) truth-seeking;
(2) individual fulfilment or development; and (3) facilitating democracy.41
For political expression in particular, the connection between it and
democracy is clear. That is why the Court has regularly held that political
expression is “‘at the core of the guarantee of free expression’”.42
In her section 2(b) analysis for the unanimous Court, McLachlin
C.J.C. largely defined away the constitutional problem that had been
identified by the claimant. The lower courts found that the statutory term
“election advertising sponsor” applied to anyone engaging in election
advertising. The point of contention was whether the registration
requirement was a reasonable limit on the freedom of expression of
individuals spending less than $500. Her judgment engaged with the
constitutional problem from a different angle. If the BC Election Act only
requires registration of sponsors, she reasoned, we must first determine
who is a sponsor rather than assuming it captures any individual or group
that engages in election advertising. She relied on the wording of the Act
and its legislative history to reach the conclusion that self-expression was
excluded from the definition of sponsorship. On this reading, an
39

Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 1, at para. 81; Libman, supra, note 2, at para. 31; Irwin
Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Irwin Toy”].
40
Thomson Newspapers, id.
41
Irwin Toy, supra, note 39, at 976.
42
BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 16.
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individual putting up a sign in the window of her home or wearing a
T-shirt with a slogan that amounted to election advertising (who was
termed in the case to be a “self-expresser”) would not be captured by the
term “sponsor” and would therefore be exempt from the registration
requirement.
The Chief Justice relied on a plain meaning interpretation of
“sponsoring”. The Act presumed in her view two scenarios for election
advertising: (1) that an entity would sponsor an election advertisement by
paying a service provider to “conduct” the advertising;43 or (2) an entity
sponsors an election advertisement but the service provider conducts it
free of charge. The first scenario involves an individual or group paying
a television or radio station to distribute an advertisement. The second
envisions the same transaction, but as an in-kind contribution without
money changing hands. In either scenario, she reasoned, there are two
parties to the transaction — the sponsor and the service provider. She
defines a sponsor as “an individual or organization who receives a
service from another individual or organization in undertaking an
election advertising campaign, whether in exchange for payment or
without charge as a contribution.”44 Where self-expression is at issue,
there is only one party, and can be no sponsor. She concluded that
“[s]ponsorship cannot be a solitary endeavour.”45 Understanding the
statute in this manner allowed her to rule that self-expressers are not
caught by the election advertising rules that only apply to “sponsors”.
The legislative history also indicated in her reading that self-expression
would not be captured. According to her judgment, the history revealed
that it was aimed at ensuring that voters had information about those who
sought to influence them at election time through advertising. With selfexpression, such as a T-shirt, bumper sticker, or sign in the window of a
house or business, the source of the advertisement is clear and the
purpose of registration is moot.
The consequence of excluding self-expressers from the definition of
election sponsor is that they have no obligation to register. With this
approach to interpreting the statute, the claimant’s case dissolved into thin
air. The strongest argument against the constitutionality of the impugned
provisions was their application to individuals engaging in self-expression
with materials that cost minimal amounts to obtain, such as markers or
43
44
45

Election Act, supra, note 8, s. 229(1)(b).
BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 39.
Id., at para. 30.
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paper needed for a handmade sign or photocopying costs for a pamphlet.
By virtue of reading her definition of sponsorship into the Act, McLachlin
C.J.C. excluded these individuals from its scope entirely. The only entities
captured by the rules, and required to register, are those who pay a second
entity for election advertisements or receive advertising services for free as
in-kind contributions. Rather than resolving the constitutional problem
posed by mandatory registration of “lone pamphleteers” that she inherited
from the British Columbia courts, the then-Chief Justice opted to answer a
different question. The Charter question as framed by the claimant was
whether requiring registration was a justified infringement of the freedom
of political expression of those spending less than $500 on sponsoring
election advertising? Chief Justice McLachlin’s statutory interpretation
transformed the question into whether the infringement on the political
expression of sponsors, narrowly defined to exclude self-expressers, was
justified? The use of this second question as the one to be addressed on the
appeal made it much easier for her to find that the limits were justified
under section 1.
The section 1 analysis was brief. The pressing and substantial purpose
was accepted with no analysis in two sentences.46 Rational connection was
dismissed in one sentence.47 Minimal impairment received some more
treatment, but any concerns about the scope of the harm introduced by the
registration provisions were rendered trivial by the narrow definition of
sponsor that excluded self-expression. “... The registration process is
simple and unlikely to deter much, if any, expression”, even if some
expression might be “chilled”.48 The case became a simple application of the
holding in Harper, common to the majority and dissent, that registration for
citizens and interest groups posed no serious constitutional harm.

III. REGISTRATION RULES
One of the indirect drawbacks of the Court’s approach that defined
away the heart of the section 2(b) problem was that it meant there was
little investigation of the function of registration rules. The Court found
that openness, transparency, and accountability were the rationales in the
Act for the registration requirement.49 There was little elaboration of
46
47
48
49

Id., at para. 51.
Id., at para. 52.
Id., at para. 54.
Id., at para. 55.
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these concepts or how registration rules relate to them. A further fleshing
out of the necessity and importance of mandatory registration would
have positioned more clearly what was at stake.
In my view there are three distinct rationales for registration rules. First,
such rules permit enforcement to occur. A registration requirement obliges
the advertising entity to release details such as contact information,
address, phone number, and its main or controlling directors. This
information is essential for being able to hold the entity to account and to
enforce violations of electoral law. The election administrator is able to
identify the responsible party for the actions of the advertising sponsor.
Second, registration also provides transparency and therefore helps the
cause of an informed electorate. Without a registration requirement, it
would be impossible for the public to know who was trying to influence
them in an advertisement. Registration is closely linked to the transparency
rule that states that the advertisement must identify who sponsored it.
The sponsoring entity can easily evade any meaningful transparency by
using a vague name, such as Citizens for the Environment. Such an entity
could be a grassroots movement of individuals, or it could be a group of oil
companies. The information disclosed on the registration form provides
sufficient information that an advertiser cannot hide its tracks. An
informed electorate furthers the principle of deliberation. Deliberation was
found to be a core component of democracy in the Secession Reference.50
Mandatory registration, combined with disclosure, allows individuals to
deliberate on the merits of the advertisement by including the source of it
in their consideration.
Third, and related to enforcement, there is an anti-evasion rationale
for requiring registration. Much of election law is geared at preventing
illegal collusion between regulated political entities for the purpose of
circumventing the rules.51 Third parties may collude to evade spending
limits or third parties and political parties may do so as well. Third
parties are required to be legally distinct from one another, just as they
are obliged to be at arm’s length from political parties. Registration of a
third party as a distinct legal entity allows collusion to be policed.
50
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 68
(S.C.C.). For a recent re-evaluation of the unwritten principles, including democracy, see Jean
Leclair, “Constitutional Principles in the Secession Reference” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem &
Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
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See Michael Pal, “Third Party Political Participation and Anti-Collusion Rules” (2018) 61:2
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Registration rules provide clear benefits. The Court defined them as
openness, transparency, and accountability. I have framed them as
enforcement, an informed electorate, and anti-evasion rationales. On
either account, registration rules are meaningful and essential
components of a functioning electoral process.
These accounts differ significantly from the claimant BC FIPA’s
arguments that registration imposes serious and concrete harms.
The organization argued that there is a value to speakers in remaining
anonymous.52 Speakers may fear government retaliation for speech that
criticizes political actors.53 They may be at risk of losing government
benefits by virtue of publicly airing their political views, in this account.
The requirement to fill in the registration form also operates as prior
restraint in this view. BC FIPA understood the harm as non-trivial and in
fact as analogous to requiring an individual to ask state permission to
attend a religious place of worship.54 In both instances, third party political
expression and religious worship, BC FIPA argued that being obliged to
seek state permission to engage in a constitutionally protected freedom is
equally incongruous with a free and democratic society.
The heart of the problem with the claimant’s argument was that its
assertions of non-trivial harm were speculative. There was no record of
over-zealous prosecutors enforcing the law in a draconian way. In fact,
there was no record of the law requiring registration being enforced
against self-expressers at all, except for a general statement from
Elections B.C. that it would do so in theory. The prospect of the state
retaliating against individuals who engaged in small level advertising
below a $500 threshold was fanciful at best. The appeal failed largely
because the appellant, BC FIPA, could not satisfy the Court that it or any
other entity or individual suffered any meaningful harm, even if the
established section 2(b) jurisprudence ensured the case would go to the
section 1 stage. Reading the appellant’s Factum, one could be forgiven
for forgetting that the compelled activity at issue was the simple act of
filling out a form during a brief window in time.55
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IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF HARPER: BILL C-76 AND PRE-WRIT
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
BC FIPA resolved a particular dispute about registration rules for
election advertising in provincial elections in British Columbia, but its
importance extends beyond those relatively narrow confines. Election
laws in Canada have been altered quite dramatically in the last 15
years.56 Some of these changes raise profound constitutional questions
about what limits the Supreme Court will permit on political expression
in order to ensure electoral integrity and a level playing field. Litigation
as to the constitutionality of new restrictions on political expression is
inevitable and indeed has already begun in some circumstances.57
The defining issue in these cases will be whether the Supreme Court will
interpret Harper narrowly, to strike down the new restrictions on
political expression, or more broadly to permit some or all of them.
BC FIPA has resonance outside of the British Columbia context
because it hints, without conclusively resolving of course, how the
Supreme Court may approach restrictions on political expression beyond
those specifically before the Court in Harper. Part of the destabilizing
potential of BC FIPA stemmed from the uncertain boundaries of the
reasoning in Harper. Harper upheld mandatory registration, spending
limits during the campaign period, and anti-collusion rules. BC FIPA
offered an opportunity for the Court to narrow the potential reach of its
holding in Harper with regard to registration, as the British Columbia
courts had done in its earlier campaign finance cases with regard to
spending limits. The Supreme Court declined to do so. In making that
choice, it left open the possibility that Harper could be read broadly to
uphold the constitutionality of restrictions on political expression that
furthered the egalitarian ideal, namely levelling the playing field so
that the wealthy or groups with resources do not dominate politics, that
served to justify limiting section 2(b) freedoms in Harper.
These boundaries of the reasoning in Harper will be tested most
directly in constitutional challenges to new legislation imposing
56
On the wide-ranging changes on campaign finance law in particular, see the contributions in
Harold Jansen & Lisa Young, eds., Money, Politics, and Democracy: Canada’s Party Finance Reforms
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011) [hereinafter “Jansen & Young”]. See
generally Michael Pal, “Three Narratives About Canadian Election Law” (2017) 16:2 Election L.J. 255.
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264

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

registration rules and spending limits in the pre-writ period. The most
robust election rules in Canadian jurisdictions, such as mandatory
registration and spending limits, apply only during the writ period.
The writ period is the official campaign period beginning with the drawing
up and issuance of writs, which is the technical way elections are
launched, and ending on election day. The spending limits in British
Columbia, but also federally, apply only during this narrowly defined
period. The juxtaposition of a relatively tightly regulated election period
against a largely unregulated pre-writ period created obvious opportunities
for third parties to engage in unlimited spending on political advertising
before the official election campaign begins. Third parties, as well as
political parties, now engage in significant spending on advertising in the
pre-writ period in the larger Canadian jurisdictions.58 Unlimited spending
in this time period undermines the egalitarian values underpinning
campaign finance rules that the Court upheld in Harper.
Governments have responded to this growth of pre-writ activity by
attempting to introduce mandatory registration and spending limits in
the pre-writ period. British Columbia’s early attempts were struck
down, but on the basis of the particular political context in the province
and the design flaws in the legislation.59 Among other changes as part
of a wholesale rewrite of its campaign finance rules, Ontario in 2017
introduced a six-month pre-writ period with mandatory registration and
a spending limit, which was in place in the lead up to the provincial
election on June 7, 2018. There is currently a constitutional challenge
to the third party rules in that legislation, though it will only be heard
well after the end of the election.60 Federally, Bill C-76, the Elections
Modernization Act, also imposes a modest pre-writ period. Introduced
in April, 2018, the constitutionality of multiple provisions of the Bill
regulating pre-writ political activity by third parties is likely to be
eventually in dispute before the courts, including its registration
and spending limit provisions. These provisions directly limit the
58
See Jansen & Young, supra, note 56; Michael Pal, “Is the Permanent Campaign the End
of the Egalitarian Model of Elections?” in Richard Albert, Paul Daly & Vanessa MacDonnell, eds.,
The Canadian Constitution in Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2018).
59
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s. 1. There is, however, no corresponding pre-writ spending limit. The registration rules largely
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expressive freedom of third parties. BC FIPA and Harper will be
directly relevant in determining the constitutionality of these
provisions.
The 2019 fixed date federal election is scheduled for October 21. Bill
C-76 would create a regulated pre-writ zone from June 30 until the start
of the official election campaign, which would be limited to a minimum
of 37 and a maximum of 50 days prior to October 21. A spending limit
would apply during this pre-writ period, with a separate amount
permitted in the writ period.61 On top of the introduction of a pre-writ
limit, the Bill expands the list of third party activities to which the
spending limit applies. Not only political advertising, but also polling,
Get Out the Vote (GOTV) or other activities captured within the category
of “partisan activities” would be subject to the limit. The Bill would also
make partisan activities occurring during the campaign period subject to
the writ period spending cap. Mandatory registration would be required
for any third party spending more than $500 in the pre-writ period, just
as it is in the official campaign.
The constitutionality of the cap on spending is likely to be at the heart
of any constitutional challenge to the legislation. The Bill attempts to
manage or decrease this risk in a host of ways. The pre-writ period is
much shorter, likely two or two-and-a-half months, than the Ontario
legislation, which has a six-month range. The definition of political
advertising in the pre-writ period will capture less speech than the
definition that is used in the writ period.62 The spending limits are also
relatively generous.
A challenge to mandatory pre-writ registration, however, will surely be
on the table as well. Registration is compelled speech, as the Court found
in Harper and BC FIPA, and therefore always raises constitutional issues.
In my view pre-writ registration rules should be seen as compliant with the
Charter. The justification for registration in the pre-writ period is the same
as it is during the writ period. Registration is necessary for enforcement
and administration, to foster an informed public and democratic
deliberation, and to police collusion or regulatory avoidance. Mandatory
registration has an impact on the freedom of political expression of citizens
61
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and interest groups that must be taken seriously. These harms, however,
are relatively minimal. Third parties may be critiqued for the political
views that they express; they may also be subjected to prosecution for
violation of the rules. A healthy democracy requires no less, however, and
there is no evidence of any other more harmful repercussions. Because of
spending in the pre-writ period by political parties and third parties, there
can be no level playing field in Canadian elections without pre-writ
registration and spending limits.
There are two central counter-arguments to this analysis. The first is
simply the classic libertarian view that the state should not restrict political
speech in any way and that Harper was wrongly decided. Much ink has
been spilled on the relative merits of egalitarian versus libertarian
approaches to campaign finance law63 and I do not have space here to
repeat that debate. Suffice it to say that egalitarianism has clearly won the
day in the jurisprudence; BC FIPA suggests that there is no appetite on the
current Court to wholly reject Harper as precedent. The caveat of course is
that the composition of the Court has changed. Chief Justice McLachlin,
the author of BC FIPA and the Harper dissent, has now retired and
replaced on the Court. There is a new Chief Justice. Current Chief Justice
Wagner, however, sat on BC FIPA and signed off on the unanimous
opinion. Justice Martin has now taken a spot on the Court. There is nothing
in Martin J.’s background to suggest her views on political expression are
off-side those of her new colleagues. In short, Harper remains the
controlling authority and it is hard to see that being revisited. The question
is still the boundaries of the reasoning in the case.
The second counter-argument is that while Harper and BC FIPA
decided the constitutionality of mandatory registration during the writ or
official campaign period, a similar obligation in the pre-writ period is
more harmful to political liberty and therefore on weaker constitutional
ground. Bill C-76 would impose restrictions on political expression over
a larger time period than is currently the case. It would also do so outside
of the immediate context of an election. It is undeniable that Bill C-76,
and pre-writ registration and spending limits in general, limit section 2(b)
freedom to a greater extent than would be the case in their absence.
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Whether the harms imposed by pre-writ registration are significant
enough to fail section 1 justification is a different matter. The Court
viewed mandatory registration in BC FIPA as being only marginally
harmful to the freedom of political expression in section 2(b) and easily
passing the threshold for being upheld under section 1. There would be a
longer time period in which registration is required under Bill C-76 with
its pre-writ registration period, but the harm remains of the same
relatively minimal quantum. The Court simply did not see mandatory
registration as imposing any serious constitutional damage. Mandatory
registration in the two months or so leading up to an election is likely to
be seen in the same light. It is not a free-standing requirement for
registration in order to exercise a fundamental freedom, but a relatively
unobtrusive obligation during a defined time period tied to the goal of
furthering a level playing field in elections. The fact that the Court in BC
FIPA unanimously and comfortably rejected the claim that registration
rules impose serious harm bodes well for the constitutionality of pre-writ
registration rules.

V. CONCLUSION — CHIEF JUSTICE MCLACHLIN’S LEGACY ON
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
BC FIPA reached the Supreme Court as a narrowly framed case. It
was on the surface about whether registration rules apply to third parties
under British Columbia’s provincial legislation. The remedy sought was
also limited to the Court reading into the provincial legislation the
federal threshold of $500 for registration that had been upheld in Harper.
The Supreme Court interpreted the provincial statute so as to exclude a
requirement of registration for self-expressers and upheld the provision
under section 1. Had the decision gone the other way and accepted the
claimant’s arguments, as narrowly framed as they were, the ramifications
would have been widespread for Canadian campaign finance law.
Mandatory registration is a component of functioning campaign finance
systems and is therefore a necessary evil, despite constituting compelled
speech. The constitutionality of mandatory registration in the pre-writ
period is likely to be one of the central constitutional questions in
upcoming litigation around Bill C-76 and related regimes in the
provinces. Given the unavoidable need to limit political expression in
order to prevent the dominance of money in the political process, the
decision in BC FIPA was a welcome one.
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The decision was authored by now-retired but then-Chief Justice
Beverley McLachlin. It is worth a final reflection on what the case says
about her legacy on democratic rights and freedoms under section 3 (the
right to vote) and section 2(b) of the Charter. The former Chief Justice has
the longest record of decision-making on democratic rights cases in the
Charter era. She co-wrote the majority decision in what remains the
leading case on electoral boundaries, Reference re Provincial Electoral
Boundaries (Saskatchewan).64 She was the author of the majority opinion
in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),65 which ruled
unconstitutional the denial of the right to cast a ballot to prisoners. It is the
leading case on the right to cast a vote, at least until the Supreme Court
issues its ruling on the constitutionality of depriving Canadian citizens
living abroad from voting in Frank v. Canada.66 Frank was originally
scheduled to be heard in February 2017, but was postponed until early
2018 at the request of the Department of Justice after Parliament tabled
legislation that would amend the impugned provision. One of the
consequences of the delay in the hearing was that Chief Justice McLachlin
was no longer on the Court. We are therefore deprived of learning how she
would apply the central precedent in the case, Sauvé, which she wrote, to
the situation of non-resident citizens.
Her dissent in Harper, discussed in this paper, was of central
importance in BC FIPA. One could characterize BC FIPA as simply
reiterating a simple point that was not in dispute between the majority
and minority in Harper — that registration requirements for third parties
are constitutional and legislatures have broad latitude with which to craft
the particularities of the obligation. On the other hand, the claimants in
BC FIPA were clearly inspired by the Chief Justice’s obvious reticence in
the Harper dissent to permit restrictions on third party expression.
The Harper dissent is the classic version of the civil libertarian argument
as applied in the campaign finance context. BC FIPA is therefore
consistent with her Harper dissent, for upholding registration rules. It
appears, however, to also reflect a shift in her opinion on these matters.
The reasoning in BC FIPA reflects much more ease with the government
restricting political liberty in order to further other values. The skepticism
64
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of modern campaign finance rules that was evident in her Harper dissent
is simply not present in BC FIPA. If anything, the former Chief Justice’s
decision for the entire Supreme Court in BC FIPA is dismissive of the
classic civil libertarian approach that she adopted in her reasons in the
Harper dissent. BC FIPA therefore perhaps reflects an evolution in her
thinking on political expression by the end of her career.

